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NOTE 
 
AN ARGUMENT FOR CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY VICTIM RESTITUTION 
IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT: UNITED 
STATES v. KENNEDY 
AMBER PRUITT* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The production of child pornography is big business.1  
Internationally, the creation and distribution of child pornography results 
in more than three billion dollars per year in revenue.2  Moreover, 
approximately two thirds of arrests for Internet-related sex crimes in the 
United States are for the production and possession of child 
pornography.3  These statistics attest to the fact that child pornography 
continues to be a serious problem.4  The frequency with which people 
  * J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, 
California; B.A. 2009, Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA. I would like 
to thank those who spent countless hours helping me to develop and edit this paper, especially Sarah 
Einhorn and Kate Baldridge. I would also like to thank my friends and family. Your love and 
support mean the world to me. 
 1 Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Untangling Child Pornography from the Adult 
Entertainment Industry: An Inside Look at the Industry’s Efforts To Protect Minors, 44 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 511, 513 (2008). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See JANIS WOLAK, KIMBERLY MITCHELL, & DAVID FINKELHOR, INTERNET SEX CRIMES 
AGAINST MINORS: THE RESPONSE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 17 (2003), available at 
www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV70.pdf. 
 4 Id. 
1
Pruitt: United States v. Kennedy
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
106  GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 43 
i
 
continue to view child pornography is disturbing because this thriving 
industry is built on the exploitation of children.5  Victims of child 
pornography are sexually abused,6 and this abuse is filmed or 
photographed.7  A single image of child pornography will often be 
reproduced and shared among offenders, usually online,8 so that 
strangers may constantly view images of the victim’s sexual abuse in 
what amount to crime-scene photos.9  Once uploaded, these images can 
never truly be removed from the Internet.10  The existence of such 
images exacerbates the trauma of the original sexual abuse.11  Victims 
must also deal with the risk that offenders who view the images may 
seek to contact them12 or use the images to groom other children for 
future sexual abuse.13  This may sound like a nightmare, but it is a reality 
for many survivors of abuse.14 
 In response to the proliferation of the child pornography industry, 
possessing child pornography has been criminalized in many countries 
around the world.15  This response is not solely due to the commonly 
accepted fact that child pornography offends traditional ideas regarding 
sexuality and social norms.16  The criminalization of child pornography 
s also a response to the level and persistence of trauma in the children 
 5 See Lina Acca Mathew, Online Child Safety from Sexual Abuse in India, 2009 J. INFO., L. 
& TECH. (May 28, 2009), available at www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2009_1/mathew. 
 6 See United States v. Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d 597, 603 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (stating that child 
pornography is by definition a “permanent record” of a child’s sexual abuse). 
 7 Id. 
 8 Melissa Wells et al., Defining Child Pornography: Law Enforcement Dilemmas in 
Investigations of Internet Child Pornography Possession, 8 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 269, 271 (2007), 
available at unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV96.pdf. 
9 See KERRY SHELDON & DENNIS HOWITT, SEX OFFENDERS AND THE INTERNET 9 (2007). 
10 Id. 
11 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009 
(1996) (“Congress finds that . . . where children are used in its production, child pornography 
permanently records the victim’s abuse, and its continued existence causes the child victims of 
sexual abuse continuing harm by haunting those children in future years . . . .”). 
12 Lorelei Laird, Pricing Amy: Should Those Who Download Child Pornography Pay the 
Victims?, A.B.A.J. (Sept. 2012), available at www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
pricing_amy_should _those_who_download_child_pornography_pay_the_victims/ (providing an 
example of a victim who was contacted and stalked by the possessors of her image). 
13 Id. 
14 See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (S.D. Ohio 2011). 
15 See YAMAN AKDENIZ, INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW: NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 9 (2008). 
16 See Stephen T. Fairchild, Note, Protecting the Least of These: A New Approach to Child 
Pornography Pandering Provisions, 57 DUKE L.J. 163, 172 (“Congress, recognizing the established 
norms of the American public, enacted laws relating to child pornography to give meaningful 
enforcement to morally and empirically based attitudes against the viewing and dissemination of 
such material and in favor of protecting the children involved in its production.”). 
2
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who are sexually abused on camera for the purpose of creating the 
images.17 
 Despite such widespread criminalization, there is currently no 
uniform definition of what constitutes child pornography.18  Federal laws 
define child pornography as generally inclusive of images of persons 
under the age of eighteen engaged in sexually explicit behavior.19  
Sexually explicit behavior can include a range of conduct such as sexual 
intercourse, sexual touching, bestiality or lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area.20  The term “sexually explicit behavior” has been 
interpreted broadly such that the definition of child pornography may 
differ between jurisdictions.21  However, the common thread in defining 
child pornography is that images must depict minor children engaged in 
sexual activities.22 
The Internet has increased both the amount of child pornography 
that is created23 and the amount of trauma that the image may cause in its 
victim.24  Now that images of child pornography can be uploaded and 
passed from user to user, victims face the possibility that their images 
will be viewed by thousands of people over many years.25  Though 
particular sites can be forced to remove such images through an 
injunction, files can always be stored and copied for redistribution.26  
Individual victims have no power over their own images—once online, 
the victim cannot force removal.27  This continuous circulation of the 
images causes many victims to feel as if the abuse is never really over, as 
their right to privacy is violated again and again.28  These victims are 
17 See What Are the Effects of Sexual Abuse?, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, 
www.apa.org/releases/sexabuse/effects.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2013); INT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & 
EXPLOITED CHILDREN, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: MODEL LEGISLATION & GLOBAL REVIEW i (2008), 
available at www.missingkids.com/en_US/documents/CP_Legislation_Report.pdf. 
18 Wells et al., supra note 8, at 271. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 See RICHARD WORTLEY & STEPHEN SMALLBONE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 9 (2006), available at www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications 
/e04062000.pdf. 
24 See What Are the Effects of Sexual Abuse?, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, 
www.apa.org/releases/sexabuse/effects.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
25 See Mark Motivans & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Federal Prosecution of Child Sex Exploitation 
Offenders, 2006,  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, Dec. 2007, at 2, available at 
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf. 
26 See WOLAK ET AL., supra note 3, at 33. 
27 See Jennifer Rothman, Note, Getting What They Are Owed: Restitution Fees for Victims of 
Child Pornography, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 333, 337 (2011). 
28 Id. 
3
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often traumatized and may require tremendous financial resources for the 
treatment required to overcome the trauma.29  As one victim reported: 
I wonder if the people I know have seen these images.  I wonder if the 
men I pass at the grocery store have seen them.  Because the most 
intimate parts of me are being viewed by thousands of strangers and 
traded around, I feel out of control . . . It feels like I am being raped by 
each and every one of them.30 
In an effort to ensure that victims of child pornography will have 
access to the resources necessary for appropriate treatment, Congress 
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2259 as part of the Violence Against Women Act of 
1994.31  This section of the Act mandates restitution for all losses 
suffered by children who have been abused in the creation and 
distribution of child pornography.32  Though the application of this 
statute is straightforward when the defendant was a party to the creation 
29 See, e.g., United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 
2009). 
30 Robert William Jacques, Note, Amy and Vicky’s Cause: Perils of the Federal Restitution 
Framework for Child Pornography Victims, 45 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1169 (2011) (quoting United 
States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-cr-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009)). 
31 18 U.S.C. § 2259 provides: 
(a) In General.—Notwithstanding section 3663 or 3663A, . . . the court shall order restitution 
for any offense under this chapter. 
(b) Scope and Nature of Order. — 
(1) Directions. —The order of restitution under this section shall direct the defendant to pay 
the victim . . . the full amount of the victim’s losses as determined by the court pursuant to 
paragraph (2). 
(2) Enforcement. —An order of restitution under this section shall be issued and enforced in 
accordance with section 3664 in the same manner as an order under 3663A. 
(3) Definition. —For purposes of this subsection, the term “full amount of the victim’s 
losses” includes any costs incurred by the victim for— 
(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care; 
(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation; 
(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses; 
(D) lost income; 
(E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and 
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense. 
(4) Order mandatory. —(A) The issuance of a restitution order under this section is 
mandatory. 
(B) A court may not decline to issue an order under this section because of— 
(i) the economic circumstances of the defendant; or 
(ii) the fact that a victim has, or is entitled to, receive compensation for his or her injuries 
from the proceeds of insurance or any other source. 
(c) Definition. —For purposes of this section, the term “victim” means the individual harmed 
as a result of a commission of a crime under this chapter . . . . 
18 U.S.C.A. § 2259 (Westlaw 2012). 
32 Id. 
4
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of the images, courts have disagreed on whether the statute also demands 
that those who later obtain and distribute the pornographic images must 
also pay restitution.33 
Recently, the Ninth Circuit took up the restitution issue in United 
States v.  Kennedy.34  When defendant Kennedy returned from an 
overseas trip, he passed through the Seattle-Tacoma Airport.35  There, 
searches of his laptop revealed more than five thousand images of child 
pornography.36  At trial, Kennedy was convicted of both possession and 
transportation of the images.37  As part of his sentence, he was ordered to 
pay restitution to two of the victims who were identified: Amy and 
Vicky.38  Kennedy appealed the restitution order and the Ninth Circuit 
held that the lower court had erred in ordering that restitution be paid, for 
three reasons.39  First, proximate cause was a necessary element to such 
awards.40  Second, proximate cause between the defendant’s possession 
of the images and the victims’ injuries was too attenuated to justify 
restitution.41  Third, the amount of damages awarded to the victims was 
arbitrary, in part because proximate cause had not been established.42 
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in United States v. 
Kennedy by vacating restitution damages for the victims to be paid by the 
possessor of their images, because denying victims such restitution 
offends traditional understandings of the limits of proximate cause43 and 
the legislative intent behind § 2259.44  There are alternative legal tests 
currently used by other circuits that establish proximate cause in child-
pornography-possessor cases that the Ninth Circuit should have applied 
in Kennedy to ensure that those responsible for harming children would 
not escape due liability.45 
33 See, e.g., United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 188 (D. Me. 2009); United States v. 
Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270, 2009 WL 2579103, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009). 
34 United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1265 (9th Cir. 2011). 
35 Id. at 1252. 
36 Id. at 1253. 
37 Id. at 1254. 
38 Id. at 1256. 
39 Id. at 1263-64. 
40 Id. at 1263. 
41 Id. at 1264. 
42 Id. at 1265. 
43 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). 
44 See, e.g., United States v. Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is clear that 
Congress intended to provide victims of sexual abuse with expansive relief for ‘the full amount of . . 
. [their] losses’ suffered as a result of abuse.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(B), adding emphasis 
and making alterations)). 
45 United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 613-14 (W.D. Pa. 2010). 
5
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Part I of this Note explains why the possession of child pornography 
falls within the scope of § 2259, which requires mandatory restitution 
awards for victims.  Part II explains why the majority of courts have 
found that proximate cause is necessary before such awards can be 
ordered.  Part III explores the existing circuit split regarding whether 
proximate cause can be established in cases where a defendant is a mere 
possessor of child pornography and describes the various tests for 
establishing such cause.  Part IV provides the facts and procedural 
history of United States v. Kennedy and explains the reasoning behind 
the court’s decision to overturn the restitution order.  Part V argues that 
the Ninth Circuit erred in its holding in Kennedy because proximate 
cause was established in the case and that the amount of restitution 
sought was proper under § 2259. 
I.    CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSION FALLS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
§ 2259 
 The Mandatory Restitution for Sex Crimes section of the Violence 
Against Women Act of 199446 requires that all victims of acts of sexual 
abuse receive restitution.47  The term “restitution” refers to monetary 
compensation paid to the victim of a crime by the person convicted of 
the crime.48  Under federal law, the amount of restitution paid to the 
victim should cover the full extent of losses suffered by the victim as a 
result of the crime.49 
 Until recently, the application of this statute suggested that 
restitution could be ordered only against offenders who had personally 
recorded or participated in the sexual abuse of children.50  This changed 
when two victims of child pornography, known only by the pseudonyms 
Amy and Vicky, sought criminal restitution in a series of cases, 
demanding that courts consider whether such restitution is also 
appropriate if the defendant was not a part of the original sexual abuse of 
the victim, but had later possessed or participated in the distribution of 
images of child pornography.51  In 2009, Amy was granted her first 
restitution award from a possessor of an image of her childhood sexual 
46 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(a) (Westlaw 2012). 
47 Id. 
48 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012). 
49 Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990). 
50 See John Schwartz, Child Pornography, and an Issue of Restitution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 
2010, at A19, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/us/03offender.html. 
51 United States v. Woods, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1110 (N.D. Iowa 2010). 
6
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abuse.52  Amy’s attorney has brought hundreds of similar cases to nearly 
every district court in the country, with varying levels of success.53  In 
United States v. Kennedy, both Amy and Vicky requested restitution 
based on defendant Kennedy’s possession of their images.54 
 The language of § 2259 supports the proposition that restitution is 
mandatory for the possessors of child pornography.  The possession of 
child pornography is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252.55  Section 2259 
states that it applies to “any offense under this chapter,”56 which includes 
§ 2252.57  Thus, § 2259 should make restitution mandatory for those who 
violate § 2252 by possessing images of child pornography.  Further, 
since the offense of possession falls within the scope of § 2259, the 
defendant is required to pay the “full amount of the victim’s losses.”58 
 The language of § 2259 also states that restitution must be paid in 
accordance with the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996,59 the 
general federal restitution statute that defines the ways in which a federal 
court may administer an award of restitution.60  The Act gives the 
government the option to seek restitution from a defendant based on a 
request by the victim.61  Though the government is not required to seek 
restitution in every case, the law dictates that if the government seeks 
restitution, judges have no discretion in the decision of whether to award 
restitution.62  If a defendant is convicted of an applicable offense that has 
caused some damage to the victim, restitution is mandated.63  Thus, the 
only issues pertaining to restitution awards are whether a victim can 
prove that a possessor of their image has actually caused the victim’s 
52 See Rothman, supra note 27, at 335 (citing United States v. Hesketh, No. 3:08-CR-00165 
(D. Conn. Feb. 23, 2009)). 
53 See Robert William Jacques, Note, Amy and Vicky’s Cause: Perils of the Federal 
Restitution Framework for Child Pornography Victims, 45 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1171-72 (2011) 
(describing the efforts of Amy in collecting restitution from the possessors of her images); Casey 
Knaupp, Attorney for Victim Asks for $3.4 Million, TYLER MORNING TELEGRAPH, Aug. 21, 2009, at 
A1, available at uk.legal.narkive.com/hvcrPme5/commercial-child-porn-in-the-usa-mediated-by-
the-courts. 
54 United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1265 (9th Cir. 2011). 
55 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Westlaw 2012) (knowingly possessing or knowingly 
accessing with intent to view child pornography). 
56 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(a) (Westlaw 2012); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251 pt. 1, ch. 110 (Westlaw 
2012). 
57 Id. 
58 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(b)(3). 
59 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(e) (Westlaw 2012). 
60 See Jacques, supra note 53, at 1183-84 (explaining the purpose behind § 3664 of 
“harmonizing” federal restitution procedures). 
61 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(d)(1). 
62 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1). 
63 Id. 
7
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losses, and whether the court can calculate these losses to a reasonable 
certainty.64 
II.   THE MAJORITY OF COURTS HAVE FOUND THAT § 2259 REQUIRES 
PROXIMATE CAUSE FOR AN AWARD OF RESTITUTION  
 Despite evidence that children are irrevocably injured by the 
distribution of child pornography, some courts have found that because a 
possessor generally does not take part in the original abuse of the child, 
he or she can be only tenuously linked to the harm.65  Thus, courts 
attempting to award restitution to victims under § 2259 must determine 
whether these offenders can be considered to have legally caused the 
harm suffered.66 
 Generally, there are two types of causation that a court will 
consider when determining whether an offender has caused the losses of 
a crime victim.  First, the court must determine if the offender’s actions 
were a “but-for” cause of the victim’s injuries.67  But-for causation exists 
when, if not for the defendant’s actions, the victim would not have been 
harmed.68  One example would be a shooting where the victim dies—but 
for the defendant shooting the victim, the victim would not have died.  
Thus, the shooter is the “but-for cause” of the victim’s death. 
 There is also a second type of causation known as proximate 
cause, when the offender’s actions were a substantial cause of the 
victim’s losses, such that the defendant should be held liable to the 
victim under the law.69  The most common test for proximate cause 
involves foreseeability.70  Foreseeability hinges on whether the harm 
resulting from an action could reasonably be predicted by the one who 
caused the harm.71  For instance, it is foreseeable that throwing a 
baseball at someone could cause him or her a blunt-force
 Proximate cause is interrupted if there is a superseding-
intervening event between the offender’s actions and the victim’s losses 
that breaks the chain of causation.72  A superseding-intervening event is 
a cause of harm that could not have been reasonably predicted by the 
64 See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1108 (N.D. Iowa 2010). 
65 United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 1999). 
66 Id. 
67 See, e.g., Washington & Georgetown R. Co. v. Hickey, 166 U.S. 521, 525 (1897). 
68 Id. 
69 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 See id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
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defendant.73  For instance, suppose the defendant poked an associate in 
the chest during a friendly discussion around a water cooler, and the 
associate subsequently jumped out a window.  This unusual reaction may 
be deemed a superseding-intervening event that relieves the defendant of 
blame for the co-worker’s death because there is no way the defendant 
could reasonably have predicted such a reaction. 
  Courts deciding whether possessors of child pornography owe 
restitution to children depicted in the images have differed regarding 
whether proximate cause is necessary for an award under § 2259.74  The 
majority of courts have held that proximate cause must be found before a 
victim can collect restitution from an offender.75  Courts holding this 
majority view have cited language under § 2259 that seems to support a 
requirement of proximate cause for all damages incurred by victims of 
child pornography.76  Such courts also cite to the legislative intent behind 
the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 198277 and the Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act of 1996, both of which clarified the mandatory 
nature of all federal restitution including the type awarded under § 
2259.78 
 In determining that the statutory construction of § 2259 includes a 
requirement of proximate cause for all types of damages, courts have 
73 Id. at 99 (majority opinion). 
74 Compare United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-cr-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 
24, 2009) (“[Section] 2259 does not clearly demand a ‘proximate cause’ standard.”), with United 
States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 188 (D. Me. 2009) (“[T]he plain language of [§ 2259] clearly 
requires that losses—to be recoverable in restitution—must have been proximately caused by the 
acts which constitute the offense of conviction.”).  See also Jacques, supra note 53, at 1183-84. 
75 See Jacques, supra note 53, at 1178 (explaining that although the majority of circuits have 
found a requirement of proximate cause within § 2259, the Fifth Circuit has rejected both the 
argument that proximate cause is a requirement for all types of losses defined in § 2259 and the 
argument that the legislative history behind federal statutes supports the proximate-cause 
requirement); see also In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 768 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (by express 
terms of § 2259, proximate-cause requirement applies only in determining “any other losses” 
suffered by victim under § 2259(b)(3)(F), but not for any other losses enumerated in § 2259(b)(3)). 
76 See, e.g., United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Section 2259 . . . 
incorporates a requirement of proximate causation: It states that the defendant shall pay ‘restitution 
for any offense’ to the ‘victim’ of the offense. It defines a ‘victim’ as ‘the individual harmed as a 
result of a commission of a crime under this chapter,’ and states that restitution shall compensate for 
‘the full amount of the victim’s losses . . . .’” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1), (c))). 
77 See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)); S. REP. NO. 
97-532, at 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2516 (explaining that the Victim and 
Witness Protection Act of 1982 was enacted in part to provide mandatory restitution awards to 
victims of certain offenses). 
78 See Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214  
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A); S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 18 (1995), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 931 (explaining congressional “intent that courts order full restitution to all 
identifiable victims of covered offenses”). 
9
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cited to § 2259(b)(3).79  This subsection enumerates common types of 
losses suffered by victims.80  This subsection broadens the types of 
losses subject to restitution by providing that restitution should include 
“any costs incurred by the victim for . . . any other losses suffered by the 
victim as a proximate result of the offense.”81  This language ensures that 
all losses suffered by victims of exploitation can be compensated by 
restitution.82  It is within this subsection that courts have read a 
proximate cause requirement for all types of losses under the statute.83 
 Though the actual words, “proximate cause” in § 2259(b)(3) 
directly precede only the description of  “any other losses,” the concept 
of ejusdem generis84 has resolved this issue for some courts.85  Ejusdem 
generis is a doctrine of interpretation that provides, “When several words 
are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and 
other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language 
demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.”86  Courts reading § 
2259 according to the doctrine of ejusdem generis have found the 
proximate cause requirement between the crime and resulting injury is 
applicable to all types of losses, not just those specifically listed.87 
 Further justification for a proximate cause requirement under § 
2259 has been based on an examination of the legislative intent behind 
federal mandatory restitution laws in general.88  The legislative intent 
behind other mandatory restitution laws is relevant to the debate 
regarding § 2259 due to Congress’ efforts to create a uniform system of 
federal restitution law that can be applied consistently to many types of 
crimes.89  To be considered a “victim” under federal mandatory 
restitution law, one must have been “directly and proximately harmed as 
a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be 
79 See, e.g., United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125-26 (3d Cir. 1999). 
80 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(b)(3)(A-E) (Westlaw 2012). 
81 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(b)(3)(F). 
82 Id. 
83 See United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204, 1208 (3d Cir. 2011). 
84 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (9th ed. 2009).  Ejusdem generis is used to interpret 
loosely written statutes.  If a law lists specific classes of persons or things and then refers to them in 
general, the general statements apply only to the same kind of persons or things specifically listed.  
For example, if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles and other motor-powered 
vehicles, “vehicles” would not include airplanes, since the list was of land-based transportation. 
85 McDaniel, 631 F.3d at 1208. 
86 Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345 (1920). 
87 McDaniel, 631 F.3d at 1208; see also What Are the Effects of Sexual Abuse?, AM. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, www.apa.org/releases/sexabuse/effects.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2013) 
(listing those types of losses enumerated by § 2259(b)(3)). 
88 United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 609 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting S. REP. NO. 
104-179, at 19 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 932). 
89 Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 609. 
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ordered.”90  Although these laws are similar to § 2259 because they 
require restitution for crime victims, they cover crimes other than child 
pornography.91 
 By examining both the language of § 2259 and the overarching 
policies that guide federal restitution law in general, most courts have 
ruled that § 2259 requires that a victim show proximate cause between an 
offense and his or her injuries before he or she will be granted restitution 
from the offender.92  However, this is not the only causation requirement 
at issue in the discussion of whether possessors of child pornography are 
liable for restitution.  Though the issue of whether proximate cause is 
necessary in these situations has been largely settled, there is still a 
circuit split as to whether such cause can ever be established in cases 
where the offender is a mere possessor of child pornography. 
III.   COURTS DISAGREE AS TO WHETHER A MERE POSESSOR OF CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY CAN BE HELD TO HAVE PROXIMATELY CAUSED A 
VICTIM’S INJURY UNDER § 2259 
 Though most courts see proximate cause as a requirement of § 
2259, courts are divided on the issue of proximate cause in regard to 
child-pornography-possessor cases.93  Some courts have ruled that 
restitution cannot be granted in this type of case because the link between 
the defendant’s possession of the images and the victim’s injuries is 
simply too remote.94  Other courts have ruled that proximate cause does 
exist in these cases and that restitution should therefore be granted.95 
 Courts that have ruled in favor of granting restitution in child-
pornography-possessor cases emphasize the fact that the language of § 
2259 states that all a victim must do is prove that he or she has suffered a 
harm in order to receive restitution.96  Once any harm is established, the 
90 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663(a)(2), 3663A(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012); see also Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 
at 606. 
91 Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 609. 
92 See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1263 (9th Cir. 2011). 
93 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
94 See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1265 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Rowe, No. 1:09-CR-80, 2010 WL 3522257, at *1-5 (S.D.N.C Sept. 7, 2010); United States v. Van 
Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042-WCO, 2009 WL 4928050 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009). 
95 See, e.g., In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 768 (5th Cir. Nov. 19, 2012) (en banc) (by 
express terms of § 2259, proximate-cause requirement applies only in determining “any other losses” 
suffered by victim under § 2259(b)(3)(F), but not for any other losses enumerated in § 2259(b)(3)); 
United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204, 1206 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Baxter, 394 F. 
App’x 377, 378 (9th Cir. 2010). 
96 See, e.g., In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 768; McDaniel, 631 F.3d at 1206; Baxter, 394 F. 
App’x at 378. 
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proximate cause requirement is met and an award of restitution becomes 
mandatory, regardless of exactly how much of the victim’s harm can be 
attributed directly to the actions of the defendant.97 
 Two explanations have emerged as to why the mere possession of 
child pornography is a proximate cause of the victims’ injuries.  The first 
approach uses the “substantial-factor” test to show that the defendant’s 
conduct was a substantial factor in the victim’s overall harm.98  The 
second approach uses the “harm-within-the-risk” test, which focuses on 
an offender’s ability to foresee that his actions are likely to cause a 
specific harm to the victim.99 
A. THE SUBSTANTIAL-FACTOR TEST 
 To establish proximate cause under the substantial-factor test, it 
must be proven that the defendant’s conduct was a “significant 
contributing factor” to the victim’s emotional damage and resulting 
financial losses.100  For example, in United States v. Hardy, the 
defendant was convicted of distributing, receiving, and possessing child 
pornography.101  The defendant took no part in the original abuse of the 
victim and obtained the images years after their creation.102  The court 
found that the child depicted in the pornographic images would still have 
been harmed whether the defendant had chosen to possess and distribute 
her images or not.103  However, the court also found that the defendant’s 
behavior aided in the circulation of the victim’s picture.104  This 
circulation harmed the victim psychologically, a harm that could not be 
separated from the original psychological injury.105  Though the 
defendant’s actions happened well after the initial injury, they were still 
found to have proximately caused some portion of the overall injury.106  
Thus, the defendant’s actions, though not the only cause, were a 
substantial factor in the harm.107 
97 See, e.g., In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 768; McDaniel, 631 F.3d at 1206; Baxter, 394 F. 
App’x at 378. 
98 United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 614 (W.D. Pa. 2010). 
99 United States v. Church, 701 F. Supp. 2d 814, 830 (W.D. Va. 2010). 
100 United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 1999). 
101 Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 613. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 614. 
107 Id. at 613. 
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B. THE HARM-WITHIN-THE-RISK TEST 
 The harm-within-the-risk test was established in section 29 of the 
Third Restatement of Torts.108  The test asks “whether there is an 
intuitive relationship between the act(s) alleged and the damages at issue 
(that is, whether the conduct was wrongful because that type of damage 
might result).”109  For example, in United States v. Monzel, the court 
determined that victims of child pornography suffer from additional 
harm after the fact of their original sexual abuse and that the risk of this 
harm is inherent within the offense of child pornography possession.110  
Courts that apply this test rely on the congressional intent behind § 2259 
to compensate victims to justify a more relaxed approach to establishing 
proximate cause in these cases, making a test based on the reasonable 
connection between a defendant’s actions and implied harm to the victim 
appropriate.111 
 
IV. UNITED STATES V. KENNEDY  
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 On November 9, 2007, Joshua Osmun Kennedy was arrested at 
the Seattle-Tacoma Airport when officials found over five thousand 
images of child pornography on his laptop computer.112  Kennedy was 
convicted of possessing and distributing images of child pornography in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252113 and sentenced to sixty months in prison 
followed by a fifteen-year period of supervised, conditional release.114  
Further, the court ordered that Kennedy pay restitution under § 2259 to 
two of the victims whose images had been found on his computer: Amy 
and Vicky.115  The government sought restitution in the total amount of 
$3,000,000 for Amy and $227,000 for Vicky on a theory of joint and 
several liability, or, alternatively, one thousand dollars for each image 
possessed by the defendant.116  The defendant asked that the court not 
108 United States v. Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87 (D.D.C. 2010). 
109 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 (2010)). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir. 2011). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 1254. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1255. 
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award restitution to either of the two women, claiming that the 
government had failed to show that an award of restitution under § 2259 
was justified in this case because proximate cause between Kennedy’s 
actions and the injuries of the victims had not been established.117  The 
trial court found that proximate cause did exist and that one thousand 
dollars per image was fair.118  The court awarded $17,000 to Amy and 
$48,000 to Vicky—one thousand dollars for each image of each 
victim.119 
 Kennedy appealed the trial court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit 
on several grounds.120  First, he claimed that the court erred in allowing 
the testimony of five law enforcement officers involved in the 
investigation of the original sexual abuse of the underage victims 
depicted in the images found on Kennedy’s computer.121  Second, 
Kennedy claimed that the court abused its discretion when it imposed the 
fifteen-year period of supervised release.122  Third, Kennedy appealed 
the court’s restitution order, claiming that the government had failed to 
prove that restitution was warranted under the statute because the 
government had not shown any cause between the victims’ losses and 
Kennedy’s possession of the pornography.123 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING REGARDING THE INVALIDITY 
OF THE RESTITUTION ORDER 
 In an opinion written by Judge Sandra Segal Ikuta, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed Kennedy’s conviction and his sentence, but vacated the 
restitution order.124  The court held that while the inclusion of the 
testimony of the officers and the imposition of supervised release were 
both proper exercises of judicial discretion, the restitution order was 
improper due to the government’s failure to establish that Kennedy’s 
mere possession of the images was a proximate cause of Amy and 
Vicky’s suffering.125  This section discusses the Kennedy court’s holding 
regarding the restitution order, which was based on its finding that the 
defendant’s actions were not a but-for or proximate cause of harm to the 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 1256. 
124 Id. at 1258, 1261. 
125 Id. 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss1/7
2013] United States v. Kennedy 119 
 
victims and that the amount of restitution damages awarded by the trial 
court was arbitrary.126 
1. The Requirements of the Mandatory Restitution for Sex Crimes 
Section of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 
 The trial court in United States v. Kennedy derived its authority to 
grant the restitution orders for Amy and Vicky from § 2259.127  This 
section of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 requires mandatory 
restitution for victims of sexual abuse.128  The Ninth Circuit began its 
analysis of that authority with a thorough examination of the language of 
the statute.129  The court found that § 2259 makes restitution mandatory 
in cases involving the sexual abuse and exploitation of children and that 
such orders must “direct the defendant to pay the victim . . . the full 
amount of the victim’s losses.”130 
  In defining the term “victim” for the purposes of restitution, the 
court turned to previous Ninth Circuit rulings regarding the proximate 
cause requirement under other federal restitution statutes, specifically the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA)131 and the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA).132  The court 
found it appropriate to analogize § 2259 with these laws because § 
2259(b)(2) states that all restitution orders must be “issued and enforced 
in accordance with” all sections of the VWPA and the MVRA.133  The 
VWPA and the MVRA define victims as those whose harms are both 
but-for and proximately caused by a defendant’s actions.134  The court 
adopted this definition of “victim” along with the requirements of both 
but-for and proximate causation.135 
 Next, the court turned to the issue of how closely connected the 
harm must be to a defendant’s actions in order to constitute proximate 
cause for restitution under § 2259.136  To determine the scope of the 
proximate cause requirement, the court once again relied on previous 
126 Id. at 1259. 
127 Id. at 1255. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 1260. 
130 Id. at 1255. 
131 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1512-1515, 3663-3664 (Westlaw 2012). 
132 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A (Westlaw 2012). 
133 Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1258. 
134 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1512-1515, 3663-3664. 
135 Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1260. 
136 Id. at 1258. 
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Ninth Circuit case law developed from the VMPA and MVPA.137  The 
court cited a range of its own prior decisions on the issue of how 
attenuated the harm may be from a defendant’s action before proximate 
cause will be destroyed in criminal cases.138  The court found that such 
decisions must walk a “middle ground.”139  That is, a loss cannot be too 
remote from an action if restitution is to be granted, but it may be at least 
one step removed from the action without destroying proximate cause.140 
  The Ninth Circuit then sought to find that middle ground.141  It 
began by citing United States v. Keith.142  In that case, the court found 
that an intervening cause between a crime and a harm did not disqualify 
a victim from being compensated for that loss because the intervening 
cause was directly related to the offensive conduct.143  The court gave the 
example of such an intervening cause from United States v. Gamma Tech 
Industries, Inc.144  In that case, a navy contractor took kickbacks in 
exchange for hiring certain subcontractors.145  This practice caused 
contractors not involved in the scheme to lose money, because the 
subcontractors who did give kickbacks were able to charge inflated 
prices for the contracts they received.146  Though the victims’ losses had 
been greatly increased by the inflated charges of the subcontractors and 
not the offender himself, the contractor was still ordered to pay the 
victims the full amount of their losses.147  Since the hiring of 
subcontractors was directly related to the offense, the court ruled that the 
defendant was liable for the losses caused by the intervening 
subcontractor conduct.148  Though there was more than one cause of the 
victims’ losses in that case, the defendant was still liable because his 
conduct was considered one of the material and proximate causes of the 
losses, though it was not the sole or total cause.149 
 After its review of cases examining the requirements of restitution 
in other federal courts and examining its own precedent, the court held 
hat proximate cause is necessary for any and all awards of restitution for 
137 Id. at 1259; see also 18 U.S.C.A §§ 1512-1515, 3663A, 3663-3664. 
138 Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1259. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 1262. 
142 Id. (citing United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
143 Keith, 754 F.2d at 1392. 
144 Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1262. 
145 Id. 
146 United States v. Gamma Tech Indus., Inc., 265 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2001). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
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crimes that fall under § 2259, whatever type of losses were incurred.150  
The court stated that proximate cause exists only when there is a causal 
connection between the conduct of the defendant and the specific losses 
of a victim.151  Although there may be multiple steps separating the 
conduct from the loss, the conduct must not be so attenuated from the 
resulting harm that it would be unreasonable to hold the defendant 
responsible.152  Lastly, there must be some degree of certainty about 
what the victim has lost before she or he can be compensated.153  Losses 
need not be calculated with mathematical precision, but they cannot be 
arbitrary.154  The court held that all of these requirements must be met 
for an award of restitution to be proper under § 2259.155
2.  The Ninth Circuit Overturned the Restitution Award 
 In Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit held that before a court can award 
restitution under § 2259, the victim  must show that he or she was truly a 
victim of the crime, that the offense was indeed a proximate cause of the 
victim’s losses, and that the victim’s losses are reasonably certain.156  On 
the first element—whether Amy and Vicky were victims of Kennedy’s 
offense—the court determined that they were.157  The court found that 
ample evidence had been submitted at trial through victim impact 
statements to prove that the women had been harmed by Kennedy’s 
possession of their images, even if they never knew that Kennedy in 
particular had possessed their images.158 
 However, the court also found that Kennedy did not proximately 
cause the injuries suffered by the women.159  The trial court had found 
that the victims’ knowledge of the existence of the images and their 
knowledge that unidentified people were viewing them caused the 
victims severe emotional stress leading to acute psychological 
problems.160  These problems and the high costs of treatment were 
recognized as specific harms to the victims.161  The trial court thus held 
150 Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1263; see also Gamma Tech, 265 F.3d at 928. 
151 Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1262. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 1260. 
155 Id. at 1263. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 See id. at 1256. 
161 See id. at 1260. 
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that Kennedy, as one of the many people possessing the images, was 
both a but-for and proximate cause of this harm because he was part of a 
larger action that was the cause of a specific harm.162  The Ninth Circuit, 
however, found that this evidence did not demonstrate a specific harm 
caused by Kennedy, but only the larger harm caused by all of the people 
downloading, possessing, and distributing the images of child 
pornography.163 
 The Kennedy court admitted that it had, in earlier decisions, held 
that restitution could be awarded when the defendant’s offense “was 
merely one part of a larger problem that caused the victim’s losses.”164  
However, the court distinguished Kennedy by pointing out that earlier 
cases had strong evidence showing that the defendants’ actions had 
directly contributed to the victims’ losses.165  For instance, in the case of 
a fraudulent real estate scheme, the court found that the head of the 
fraudulent endeavor was liable for all the losses suffered due to a high 
rate of foreclosures, despite the defendant’s argument that the 
foreclosures had been caused by the independent financial circumstances 
of homebuyers and not his crime.166  The court held the defendant liable 
because the crime itself was evidence that his conduct was a direct cause 
of the losses, though his fraud was not the only cause of the losses.167  
The court found such evidence to be lacking in Kennedy.168  The court 
held that without proof that Kennedy in particular had caused some 
separate and discernable harm to Amy and Vicky, he could not be held 
accountable for any of the harm the women had suffered.169  Thus, the 
court rejected the government’s theory that Kennedy was the proximate 
cause of the victims’ injuries for the purpose of a restitution award.170 
 The court also found that the losses of the victims could not be 
calculated with reasonable certainty.171  It found no proof that the 
government’s determination that an award of one thousand dollars per 
image would fairly compensate the victims for the “full amount of [their] 
losses.”172  The government attempted to address this by asking the court 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 1264. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. (citing United States v. Peterson, 538 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
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to award restitution under a theory of joint and several liability.173  The 
court rejected that theory, finding that it did nothing to cure the fact that 
there was no evidence connecting Kennedy’s actions and the victims’ 
specific harms.174  The court determined that it would be impossible to 
hold Kennedy responsible for any harm unless there was some evidence 
that his downloading of the images had caused an injury that was 
somehow separate and distinct from the rest of the harms suffered due to 
the creation and distribution of the images.175  Since they did not see any 
proof of such harm in this case, the court overturned the trial court’s 
restitution order.176 
 
V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED WHEN IT OVERTURNED THE 
RESTITUTION ORDER, BECAUSE PROXIMATE CAUSE EXISTED, 
AND THE AWARD WAS APPROPRIATE UNDER § 2259 
 In the Kennedy opinion, the court stated in the final paragraphs: 
[W]e suspect that § 2259’s proximate cause and reasonable calculation 
requirements will continue to present serious obstacles for victims 
seeking restitution in these sorts of cases.  Nevertheless, the 
responsibility lies with Congress, not the courts, to develop a scheme 
to ensure that defendants . . . are held liable for the harms they cause 
through their participation in the market for child pornography.177 
The reasoning behind the court’s reluctance to award restitution in 
child pornography cases is that there is a proximate cause requirement 
within § 2259 that precludes victims from collecting damages for any 
losses that are not directly caused by the offense.178  The Ninth Circuit 
found that there is no way to prove that a possessor of child pornography 
has directly caused the losses of children featured in pornographic 
images.179  Further, even if such a thing could be proven, there would 
still be no way to quantify how much damage each possessor had 
individually caused.180  The court found that the inability to separate and 
determine specific damage caused by an individual defendant is an 
173 Id. at 1265. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 1264. 
177 Id. at 1266. 
178 See id. at 1265. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
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insurmountable obstacle to restitution because restitution must be based 
on a reasonable calculation of a victim’s losses.181 
 The Kennedy court’s logic is flawed in two important aspects.  
First, there are tests used by other courts that establish proximate cause 
in child-pornography-possessor cases that allow specific damages to be 
determined in situations where multiple offenders contribute to a mass 
harm.182  One of these is the substantial-factor test.183  The Ninth Circuit 
has already adopted “substantial factor” into the definition of proximate 
cause in the torts context and it should have applied this theory to 
criminal restitution,184 because criminal restitution is determined by 
applying torts concepts.185  There is also the harm-within-the-risk test.186  
The Third Restatement of Torts has recently adopted this test within the 
proper definition of proximate cause because it reduces confusion in 
cases involving multiple causes.187  This test is well-suited for use in 
child-pornography-possessor cases because it does not require but-for 
cause, instead apportioning liability based on the reasonable 
foreseeability of harm.188 
 Second, despite the Ninth Circuit’s holding, the amount of 
restitution awarded in Kennedy was supported by § 2259 because it was 
reasonable.189  Though the nature of psychological damages makes it 
difficult to assign an exact dollar amount to the victims’ losses, it is a 
proper exercise of judicial discretion under § 2259 to set any dollar 
amount so long as the amount is reasonable,190 as it was in this case.  
Further, nominal damages may be awarded even when there is no way to 
determine the victims’ losses to a reasonable degree of certainty,191 
which supports the view that restitution damages are not directly tied to 
what losses a victim can prove.192  Under either of these theories of 
181 Id. 
182 See United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 613-14 (W.D. Pa. 2010); United States v. 
Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87 (D.D.C. 2010). 
183 See Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 613. 
184 See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005). 
185 See Matthew Spohn, Note, A Statutory Chameleon: The Mandatory Victim Restitution 
Act’s Challenge to the Civil/Criminal Divide, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1013, 1015-16 (2001) (“[Criminal 
restitution] is civil—in compensating victims for their specific losses, it resembles an attenuated tort 
proceeding held during a pause in a criminal proceeding.”). 
186 See Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 87. 
187 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 (2010). 
188 Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 87. 
189 See United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 614-15 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (discussing the 
ability of a court to approximate restitution damages based on the defendant’s role in the overall 
harm to the victim). 
190 Id. at 613. 
191 United States v. Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d 597, 607 (S.D. Ohio 2011). 
192 Id. 
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restitution, the amount awarded to the victims in Kennedy was 
appropriate.193 
 Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s holding, the trial court’s restitution 
order met the test for mandatory restitution because proximate cause 
existed and because damages were supported by § 2259.194  Given this, 
the Ninth Circuit should have upheld the restitution order in Kennedy.195 
A. THERE WAS PROXIMATE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE RESTITUTION 
ORDER IN KENNEDY 
 The Ninth Circuit held that no proximate cause exists between the 
possession of child pornography and the injuries suffered by the 
victims.196  However, courts in other circuits have developed tests that 
show proximate cause can be established in child pornography 
possession cases.197  One of these tests is the substantial-factor test and 
another is the harm-within-the-risk test.198 
1. The Ninth Circuit Should Have Used the Substantial-Factor Test 
To Find Proximate Cause Between Child Pornography-
Possessors and the Harm Suffered by Their Victims 
 The substantial-factor test has been adopted by the Ninth Circuit 
as a relevant test for establishing proximate cause in tort claims.199  
Though legally distinct from tort cases, criminal restitution claims are 
decided using tort concepts.200  The Ninth Circuit applied the traditional 
tort concepts of proximate and but-for cause in its analysis of the validity 
of the restitution order in Kennedy,201 but dismissed the use of the 
substantial-factor test in this context without discussion of why it would 
opt to limit the definition of proximate cause in the specific context of 
criminal law.202  Without a specific reason for dismissing the use of the 
previously adopted test, the court should have applied it because it is one 
193 See id; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(4)(A) (Westlaw 2012). 
194 See discussion infra Part V.A-B. 
195 Id. 
196 See United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1252 (9th Cir. 2011). 
197 See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 613 (W.D. Pa. 2010). 
198 See discussion supra Part III.A-B. 
199 See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005). 
200 See Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 613. 
201 See Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1261. 
202 Id. at 1261. 
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of the traditional methods for establishing proximate cause in cases 
where there are multiple causes of harm.203 
 Other courts have already applied the substantial-factor test in the 
criminal context.204  Though the Ninth Circuit has generally applied the 
substantial-factor test only to tort claims, the substantial-factor test has 
been used in federal district courts within the Third Circuit to establish 
proximate cause in cases of child pornography possession like in 
Kennedy.205  Under the substantial-factor test, it must be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s conduct was a 
“significant contributing factor” to the victim’s emotional injuries.206  
For example, in United States v. Hardy, the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania found that while the possession 
of child pornography is not the only cause of injury to children depicted 
in the images, it is a substantial factor in their harm.207  Thus, the timing 
of the initial abuse is not a superseding cause that will protect a child 
pornography-possessor from liability.208 
 This test is especially relevant to Kennedy because Kennedy’s 
possession of the pictures was so removed in time from the original 
sexual abuse of the victims.209  In essence, the Kennedy court determined 
that the damage to the victims had already been done by the time 
Kennedy committed his offense.210  The substantial-factor test, as 
applied to cases such as Kennedy, illustrates that the possession of child 
pornography does not need to be shown to have retroactively caused the 
original injury.211  The possession only needs to be shown to have caused 
a substantial part of the overall harm suffered by the victim.212  Child 
ornography-possessors do cause a substantial portion of the harm 
203 See Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 612 (“[T]he ‘substantial factor’ test formulation . . . is one 
means of accounting for the unusual situations where limiting proximate causation to a subset of but 
for cause is inappropriate to the ends of justice.”). 
204 Id. at 614. 
205 Id. (explaining that a mere child pornography possessor is a substantial factor in the 
victim’s harm because the possessor aided in the circulation of the images.) 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 See Jacques, supra note 53 at 1171-72 (describing the efforts of Amy in collecting 
restitution from the possessors of her images); Knaupp, supra note 53 (explaining that the 
pornographic images depicting Any and Vicky were taken decades ago when the women were young 
children). 
210 See United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1264 (9th Cir. 2011) (determining that the 
defendant’s participation in the “audience” was not evidence that he had contributed to the losses 
suffered by the women). 
211 Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 612 (relying on United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 
1999)). 
212 Id. 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss1/7
2013] United States v. Kennedy 127 
 
because the knowledge that the image is being viewed causes fresh 
psychological pain and prevents a victim from ever truly moving past the 
abuse.213 
 In Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the actions of 
the defendant did cause a portion of the harm suffered by the victims, but 
held that proximate cause could not be established because the harm was 
not specific.214  This means that the court could not find an injury that 
was caused by Kennedy alone—an injury that was separate from the 
injuries caused by all other possessors of the pornography.215  The 
substantial-factor test solves the problem of defining specific harm 
through a concept known as “concurrent causes.”216  Concurrent causes 
occur when multiple people each do something “which would, on its 
own, be sufficient to bring about the harm.”217  For example, if two 
people shoot a person at the same time and that person dies, then both of 
these acts are considered to be the proximate cause of death, despite the 
fact that the victim would have died of either wound independent of the 
other.218  Accordingly, the Kennedy court should have found that the 
defendant’s possession of child pornography was a concurrent cause of 
the victims’ harm despite the fact that the victims would have been 
harmed even if Kennedy had never obtained their images.219  By 
acknowledging that Kennedy caused at least some of the harm to his 
victims, the court established that Kennedy, like the defendant in Hardy, 
was in fact a proximate cause of the injuries because his offense, though 
certainly not the entire cause of the harm, was a substantial factor in his 
victims’ injuries.220  Thus, under its own definition of proximate cause, 
the Ninth Circuit should have found proximate cause in this case.221 
213 See id. at 613; Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1263. 
214 Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1263. 
215 Id. 
216 See Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 612. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 See id. 
220 See id. at 613. 
221 See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The traditional notion of 
‘but for’ causation is subsumed within the substantial factor test, whereby defendants’ actions may 
be the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injuries if those actions were a substantial factor in bringing 
them about.”). 
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2. The Ninth Circuit Could Have Used the Harm-Within-the-Risk 
Test To Find Proximate Cause Between the Possession of Child 
Pornography and the Victims 
 Even if the Kennedy court determined that the substantial-factor 
test was inappropriate, it still should have found proximate cause through 
the harm-within-the-risk test adopted by the Third Restatement of 
Torts,222 applied in the criminal context by the United States District 
Court of the District of Columbia in United States v. Monzel,223 and 
approved of in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit in a review of that case.224  Instead of focusing on 
whether the defendant’s actions caused a substantial amount of harm to 
the victims, this test asks whether the harm to the victim was a result of 
the risk inherent in the defendant’s actions that made those actions illegal 
in the first place.225  This test has been used in circuits where the 
substantial-factor test has fallen into disfavor.226 
 Unlike the substantial-factor test, this test states that but-for cause 
is not a requirement for establishing liability in all cases.227  In cases 
where there are “multiple sufficient causes”—in which the victim would 
have suffered the same harm by others had the defendant not acted—but-
for cause is inappropriate because a requirement of this type could 
absolve all co-defendants of liability for their actions.228  This would 
make it impossible for victims to collect restitution from any of those 
responsible for their injuries.  Not providing an avenue toward victim 
restitution in those circumstances would violate the intent of victim 
restitution—that it be compensatory for victims as well as punitive to 
defendants.229 
 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has 
held that the possession of child pornography does contain an inherent 
risk of harm to the victims.230  In United States v. Monzel, the defendant-
ossessor of child pornography was convicted of charges identical to 
222 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 27, 29 (2010); United States v. Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 
2d 76, 87 (D.D.C. 2010). 
223 Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 87; see also Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 412 F. Supp. 2d 99, 
111 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d, 531 F.3d 884 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
224 See United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
225 Id. at 87. 
226 See id. at 85. 
227 Id. at 87. 
228 Id. at 86-87. 
229 Id. at 88 (citing S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 
925). 
230 Id. at 87. 
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those in Kennedy.231  At trial, the defendant argued that there was no but-
for causation in the case because the victim would have suffered the 
same harm whether or not the defendant had possessed the images, based 
on the fact that countless others had already possessed them.232  The 
Monzel court agreed with this, but determined that, according to the 
harm-within-the-risk test, the defendant was still a proximate cause of 
the victim’s injuries, despite the fact that he may not have been a direct 
cause of the injuries.233 
 The district court also determined that the risk inherent in the 
mere possession of child pornography is sufficient to establish proximate 
cause between such conduct and the damage caused to child pornography 
victims.234  The court cited to congressional findings noting that a 
separate injury occurs each time a victim’s image is downloaded.235  The 
Monzel court stated that Congress’s awareness that such injuries occur 
means that there is a risk of injury to victims that exists inherently within 
the crime of child pornography possession.236  Thus, when harm does 
result, offenders must be held liable.237  As discussed, the fact that many 
people are committing the same crime does not absolve a defendant from 
responsibility in cases where a victim has suffered in part due to the 
defendant’s actions.238  The but-for cause requirement is not meant to be 
a shield to protect those who commit offenses along with many others.239  
Thus, in special cases like the possession of child pornography, the 
harm-within-the-risk test provides the best way to assign liability to those 
who are at fault.240 
231 Id. at 77. 
232 Id. at 86. 
233 Id. at 87. 
234 Id. at 88. 
235 See id. at 86 (“Although the victims may have been suffering from such fear and anxiety 
prior to an individual defendant’s conduct, each notification of a defendant’s conduct perpetuates the 
trauma, thereby prolonging recovery, and increasing harm to the victim.”). 
236 Id. at 87. 
237 See id. at 88 (“The ‘risk’ inherent in [defendant’s] participation in the child pornography 
market by receiving and possessing such images therefore includes the risk that the children whose 
abuse is depicted will suffer as a result.”). 
238 Id. at 86-87. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
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B. THE AMOUNT OF RESTITUTION GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
IN KENNEDY WAS APPROPRIATE UNDER § 2259 
 The second major issue present within the Ninth Circuit’s analysis 
of the restitution order in Kennedy was whether the amount of restitution 
damages was appropriate under § 2259.241  The trial court in Kennedy 
awarded the victims one thousand dollars per image in Kennedy’s 
possession.242  The Ninth Circuit rejected this award amount as 
arbitrary.243  However, the court should have found that this amount was 
reasonably connected to the losses suffered by the victims. 
 
1. One Thousand Dollars Per Image Was Reasonable 
Compensation for the Victims’ Losses in Kennedy Because § 
2259 Grants Broad Judicial Discretion for Such Awards and the 
Amount Was Based on the Actual Damages Suffered 
 Although courts have little discretion as to whether restitution 
should be ordered when a defendant has been convicted of the possession 
of child pornography, § 2259 defines restitution broadly to ensure that all 
victims or sexual abuse are generously compensated.244  In Kennedy, the 
entirety of the damages sought was $3,000,000 for Amy and $227,000 
for Vicky, but the trial court instead awarded one thousand dollars for 
each image the defendant possessed.245  The trial court made this 
decision in the interest of reasonableness.246 
 The language of § 2259 illustrates that the statute is meant to be 
interpreted broadly, so long as the amount of restitution has some 
connection to the damages and is not arbitrary.247  Courts are not to 
consider the financial circumstances of the defendant in determining a 
reasonable amount of restitution, only the losses of the victims.248  
However, the statute also directs the award of restitution “as determined 
by the court . . . in accordance with section 3664 in the same manner as 
 
241 United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1264 (9th Cir. 2011). 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
244 United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Congress mandated broad 
restitution for a minor victim following an offender’s conviction of federal child sexual exploitation 
and abuse offenses.”); United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 966 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Section 2259 is 
phrased in generous terms, in order to compensate the victims of sexual abuse for the care required 
to address the long term effects of their abuse.”). 
245 Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1255. 
246 Id. at 1256. 
247 Id. at 1260; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(b)(3)(F) (Westlaw 2012). 
248 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(b)(4)(B)(i). 
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an order under section 3663A.”249  Under § 3664, which is the section 
that determines the amounts for awards of restitution under § 3663A and 
therefore under § 2259, the circumstances of a defendant matter in cases 
where there is more than one defendant.250  In such cases, the “court may 
make each defendant liable for payment of the full amount of restitution 
or may apportion liability among the defendants to reflect the level of 
contribution to the victim’s loss and [the] economic circumstances of 
each defendant.”251  It is under this framework that the trial court in 
Kennedy chose to limit the award amount to one thousand dollars per 
image, believing that the full amount of the women’s losses would be 
unfairly imposed on a defendant who had not caused all the losses since 
many other people had downloaded pictures of the victims in addition to 
Kennedy.252 
 Further, the amount of one thousand dollars per image was not 
arbitrary as the Ninth Circuit asserted.  Kennedy caused harm each time 
he downloaded a new image and continued the cycle of exploitation of 
the victims.253  Thus, linking the amount of restitution to the number of 
images he downloaded is reasonable.  Further, because his crime is likely 
to result in additional therapy, lost wages, and medical expenses, one 
thousand dollars for each image is consistent with the foreseeable 
expenses of his victims.254  Thus, the award was not arbitrary, and it was 
directly related to the damage the defendant caused.  Since proximate 
cause is likely to have been established in this case, and since the 
restitution award amount was reasonable and supported by the intent 
behind § 2259, the Ninth Circuit erred when it decided that Amy and 
Vicky were owed no restitution in this case. 
2. The Award Amount in Kennedy Was Also Reasonable Under a 
Theory of Nominal Damages 
 Even if the Ninth Circuit determined that the losses in Kennedy 
could not be reasonably calculated, the victims were still owed nominal 
 
249 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(b)(1). 
250 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663A, 3664(h) (Westlaw 2012); see also United States v. Sensmeier, 361 
F.3d 982, 990 (7th Cir. 2004) (“When there is more than one defendant that has contributed to the 
loss of a victim, district courts enjoy the option of either imposing full liability on each defendant or 
apportioning the liability among the defendants to reflect the culpability . . . of each.”). 
251 United States v. Zander, 319 F. App’x 146, 150 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
3664(h)). 
252 United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 2011). 
253 See United States v. Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87 (D.D.C. 2010) (explaining the new 
trauma that occurs with the distribution of child pornography). 
254 See discussion supra Part V.B.1. 
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damages.255  In another child-pornography-possessor case, the United 
States District Court of the Southern District of Ohio agreed with the 
Ninth Circuit that there is a real harm caused to the victims of child 
pornography.256  However, unlike the Ninth Circuit, the court in United 
States v. Klein found that at least nominal damages are required in such 
cases, even if the court found that there was not enough evidence to 
establish the full amount of a victim’s losses.257  An award of nominal 
damages for the victims of child pornography-possessors is supported by 
the mandatory nature of § 2259, because it allows judges to award 
damages as required by the statute in cases where multiple offenders 
make it difficult to determine the exact amount of damages.258  In a civil 
context, nominal damages are generally a small amount of money 
awarded to a plaintiff in a lawsuit to show she or he was right but has 
suffered no significant losses.259  In the child pornography-possessor 
context, an award of nominal damages is a basis for the judge to assign 
what he or she feels are reasonable damages under the circumstances.260  
In Klein, the court found that nominal damages in the amount of five 
thousand dollars were reasonable restitution paid by a child 
pornography-possessor to his victim.261  The trial court in Kennedy 
assigned a similarly low amount of restitution at one thousand dollars per 
image.262  The Ninth Circuit should have upheld this restitution award 
because it was within the trial judge’s discretion under the theory of 
nominal damages and reasonable under the circumstances.263 
CONCLUSION 
 It is not easy to determine the amount of harm caused to a child 
each time a person downloads an image of the original abuse.264  The 
nability to assess how the harm from one offender is unique from the 
255 See United States v. Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d 597, 607 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (“[W]here a party 
‘establishes a wrong and actual loss therefrom, he or she is entitled to nominal damages at least . . . 
where the evidence fails to show the extent of the resulting damages.’” (quoting 25 C.J.S. Damages 
§ 14 (2009)). 
256 Id. at 607. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 607-08. 
259 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 175 (9th ed. 2009) 
260 Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 607. 
261 Id. 
262 United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 2011). 
263 Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 607-08. 
264 See discussion supra Part III.A-B; see also Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1260 (discussing 
generally the fact that courts have differed about which techniques are appropriate for determining 
restitution damages). 
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harm of another offender played a large role in the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision to overturn the restitution award in Kennedy.265  However, the 
Ninth Circuit did find that offenders who collect and view child 
pornography do contribute to the harm suffered by these victims.266  
Thus, under the language of § 2259, it is mandatory that the court 
quantify this harm in order to compensate the victims who must deal 
perpetually with the scars of their abuse.267  The Ninth Circuit’s decision 
ignores the mandatory requirement of the statute in favor of an overly 
strict interpretation of causation requirements that is not supported by 
Ninth Circuit precedent or by the legislative intent behind § 2259.268 
 Determining how much harm an offender should be liable for is 
not impossible under § 2259.269  The Ninth Circuit was correct in its 
assessment that proximate cause must be established, but incorrect in its 
limited definition of how that can be achieved.270  The Ninth Circuit has 
already accepted the use of the substantial-factor test in other contexts.271  
The court should have applied this test in this case to establish proximate 
cause in Kennedy.272  Other courts have used this test to find proximate 
cause in child-pornography-possessor cases.273  Even if the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the substantial-factor test should not be extended, 
alternative formulations for determining proximate cause, such as the 
harm-within-the-risk test, could have been adopted in order to comply 
with the mandatory nature of restitution.274 
 The Supreme Court has recently denied certiorari on the issue of 
proximate cause in child pornography cases.275  This means that Kennedy 
is, at least for the time being, the death knell for child pornography 
restitution in the Ninth Circuit.  Sadly, without such compensation, many 
victims of child pornography will not have the resources to get the help 
they need, and they will continue to suffer.  If child pornography is ever 
to be stopped, possessors must be made to take responsibility for their 
265 Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1264. 
266 Id. at 1260. 
267 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(b)(4)(A) (Westlaw 2012); see also United States v. Hardy, 707 F. 
Supp. 2d 597, 613-14 (W.D. Pa. 2010). 
268 See discussion supra Part V.A. 
269 See discussion supra Part III.A-B. 
270 See discussion supra Part III.A-B. 
271 See discussion supra Part III.A-B. 
272 See discussion supra Part III.A-B. 
273 See discussion supra Part III.A-B. 
274 See discussion supra Part III.A-B. 
275 Jeffrey Brown, SCOTUS Denies Cert in Case on CP Victim Restitution, CYBERCRIME 
REVIEW (Nov. 29, 2011), www.cybercrimereview.com/2011/11/scotus-denies-cert-in-case-on-cp-
victim.html. 
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actions.  Further, if these victims can ever hope to be made whole, courts 
must make compensating them a priority.  If not, their futures may be 
very dark indeed. 
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